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DETECTING ABNORMAL AND COLLUSIVE BIDS IN CAPPED 
TENDERING 
Abstract 
Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to 
implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning 
contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring 
Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in 
capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also 
be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard 
pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally 
needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any 
person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might 
be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of 
tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph. 
Keywords: tender; auction; collusion; abnormal bid; phony bid; bid-covering. 
1. Introduction 
Collusive tendering (or bid rigging) occurs when businesses that would otherwise be 
expected to compete, secretly conspire to raise prices or lower the quality of goods or 
services for purchasers in a bidding process [1]. Collusive tendering can be particularly 
harmful if it affects public procurement, since in OECD countries public procurement 
accounts for approximately 15% of GDP [2] and in other countries that figure is even 
higher [3]. 
Such conspiracies take resources from purchasers and taxpayers, diminish public 
confidence in the competitive process, and undermine the benefits of a competitive 
marketplace [4]. State and federal legislation have proscribed such agreements to 
protect consumers from collusive behavior, and considerable resources are dedicated 
every year to prosecuting colluders [5, 6]. 
‘Cover bidding’ or ‘bid-covering’ (also called complementary, courtesy, token, or 
symbolic cover) is the most frequent way in which collusive schemes are implemented 
[7]. Cover bidding occurs when individuals or firms agree to submit bids that involve at 
least one of the following: (1) a competitor agrees to submit a bid that is higher than the 
bid of the designated winner; (2) a competitor submits a bid that is known to be too 
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high to be accepted; or (3) a competitor submits a bid that contains special terms that 
are known to be unacceptable to the purchaser [2]. 
Cover bidding is generally designed to give the appearance of genuine competition. 
Thus, classifying bids as abnormally high or low and fighting collusion is a primary 
concern for auctioneers or any Contracting Authority since bidders who manage to 
forma cartel (a group of firms intending to limit competition among the participants in 
one or several tenders) can harm seriously the Contracting Authority’s revenue [8, 9]. 
In fact, Klemperer [10] and Anderson et al. [11] argue that collusion and other 
competition policy issues are more relevant for practical auction design than the risk-
aversion, affiliation, and budget-constraint issues that play a prominent role in 
mainstream auction theory. 
The literature suggests several ways for auctioneers to implement auction rules that 
discourage collusion [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. However, these theoretical solutions 
have several practical limitations since collusion-proof mechanisms require the 
auctioneer to know the distribution functions from which bidders draw their values and 
know which bidders belong to which cartel. 
In practice, such information is difficult, if not impossible, to acquire [9]. It should be 
noted that collusion schemes can be very difficult to detect as they are typically 
negotiated in secret and may not be evident from the results of a single tender [5]. 
Often a collusive scheme is revealed only when one examines a regular pattern of 
suspicious behavior from a number of tenders over a period of time [1]. 
Another well-known collusive scheme is so-called ‘bid rotation’ [19, 20]. In this kind of 
scheme (not exclusively used with a bid-covering strategy), conspiring firms continue to 
bid, but agree to take turns being the winning (i.e., lowest qualifying) bidder. The way in 
which bid-rotation agreements are implemented can vary greatly. 
Nevertheless, a correlation between the current result in a particular tender and past 
results is not necessarily due to collusion. Particularly, when bidders’ cost functions 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale, bid rotation can also result from a competitive 
bidding behavior. That is, for example, firms with idle capacity have lower marginal 
costs and hence, are more likely to win a contract than those with ongoing contracts 
[20, 21]. 
To prosecute and, by so doing, deter future collusion, we need to know how to detect 
collusive behavior. We need a set of tools that can help indicate when certain behavior 
is collusive or, at least abnormal, in order to point auctioneers or Contracting 
Authorities in the right direction [22]. While collusive behavior exists in all types of 
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markets, this paper focuses on alerting the possibility of collusive bid-covering by firms 
competing in either public or private sealed-bid auctions or tenders with other criteria 
apart from the economic price. 
Broadly speaking, sealed-bid auctions and tenders assume that firms submit sealed 
bids (either only economic bids or technical and economic bids, respectively) for a 
procurement contract and that the contract is awarded to the lowest (or the 
economically most advantageous) bidder. These rules are common practice in the vast 
majority of public sector procurements, and they are used in many auctions in the 
private sector as well [5, 23]. 
Because of the multiple technical and financial criteria involved in public and private 
tendering [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32], there is still a need for the development of 
new tools to help decision makers and improve the selection process for bidders [33]. 
In this connection, new developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have 
enabled bidders to implement new kinds of easy-to-use tools for increasing their 
chances of winning contracts [34, 35, 36]. Although these new tools are genuinely 
designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper limit on price), some 
of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which 
bidders do not follow a regular pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. 
This paper presents a new test for detecting abnormally high or low bids among those 
who enter a tender, and taking advantage of the data, any tender analyst or person in 
charge of supervising capped tenders will be able to suspect which bidders are 
involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders 
by means of a simple method. 
2. Background 
A large body of economic theory has demonstrated that both competitive and collusive 
bidding strategies depend on the rules of the auction and the cost structure of the 
bidders [20, 37, 38, 39, 40]. 
Theories of collusion in auctions also highlight the role of a pre-auction meeting of 
bidders. Generally, incentives are provided from the winner to the losers. McAfee and 
McMillan [41] characterized efficient collusion when no side transfer is possible. It is a 
static scheme in which the choice of the designated winner is independent of the 
history. The analysis is extended to a repeated framework by Aoyagi [42] and 
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [43], who analyze collusion without side transfer in 
repeated auctions. In contrast to McAfee and McMillan’s static bid rotation [41], they 
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construct dynamic bid rotation schemes in which bid coordination is based on past 
history. 
In contrast to the theoretical literature, the inner working of the bidding rings has 
attracted little attention in the empirical literature [6, 41], although there is much 
empirical work aimed at detecting collusion in procurement auctions [44, 45]. Most 
studies illustrate how the bidding behavior of a set of collusive bidders differs from 
competitive behavior. 
In this connection, Porter and Zona [20] modeled the probability of a bidder winning 
under competitive bidding. They specify a bidder’s bidding function to be linear in 
observable cost factors, thus imposing an assumption that their coefficients are the 
same among firms, and then analyze the probability of each bidder’s win given the cost 
factors as a conditional logit model [40]. 
Subsequently, Bajari and Ye [46, 47] thoroughly observed the violation of two 
conditions: ‘conditional independence’ and ‘exchangeability’ that a competitive bidding 
strategy must always satisfy. The first condition implied by competitive bidding requires 
that the bids of various competing firms should not be correlated, after we have 
adjusted for the impact on their bids of all publicly observed information about the 
project. On the other hand, if a subset of firms (the cartel members) in an industry have 
coordinated on how to bid before an auction, their bids will typically be correlated in a 
manner that can be detected. 
The second condition implied in competitive bidding is ‘exchangeability’. This means 
that all competing firms behave in the same way when faced with the same cost 
structure for themselves and rival firms. If the publicly observed factors affecting costs 
or other information that firms use to compute their bids are permuted or exchanged 
among firms, then the bids should permute among the firms in the same way when 
exchangeability holds. 
Thus, Bajari and Ye [46, 47] extended the important analysis of Porter and Zona [20, 
40] in several ways. Firstly, Porter and Zona did not specify an equilibrium model of 
either competitive or collusive bidding in their analysis. Secondly, Bajari and Ye [46, 47] 
introduced new tests for collusion that were not presented by Porter and Zona that 
enable a Contracting Authority to address the problem of identifying which bidders are 
members of the cartel. The tests in Porter and Zona [20, 40], on the other hand, took 
the identity of the cartel members as given. 
Finally, Ballesteros-Pérez et al. [34, 35, 36] developed a Bid Tender Forecasting Model 
(BTFM) applicable to capped tendering. This model capitalizes on a new conception of 
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analyzing bidder behavior and presents its results via three kinds of graphs: iso-Score 
Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs. 
With the aim of identifying those bidders who do not follow a regular or predictable 
pattern, that is, bidders whose behavior is not ‘conditionally independent’ and 
‘exchangeable’, the BTFM developed by Ballesteros-Pérez et al. will be partially used 
and reformulated for detecting extremely high or low phony bids. 
3. Basic definitions 
Spanish tendering terminology is mainly used as this study was carried out in Spain, 
although some new terms are included. The analysis described in this paper has been 
applied to capped tenders, that is, tenders with upper price limit stated in the tender 
specifications by the Contracting Authority. 
For the sake of clarity, some terms have been defined (see Appendix A). 
‘Bidder’s Drop’ (Di) is the discount or bid reduction on the initial price of a contract (A) 
submitted by a given contractor i for a particular capped tender. It is mathematically 
expressed as: 
𝐷𝑖 = 1 −
𝐵𝑖
𝐴
     (1) 
where Di is the drop (expressed in per-unit values) of bidder ‘i’; Bi is the bid (expressed 
in monetary values) of bidder ‘i’; and A is the initial Amount of money (in monetary 
value) of the tender (generally set by the Contracting Authority in many countries). 
In Spanish tendering practice, when referring to bid amounts, it is usual to use a 
discount on the contract value A. This discount is called ‘baja’ in Spanish, meaning 
literally ‘fall’ or ‘drop’. This term has been translated as ‘drop’ because no similar 
concept has been found in the international literature. 
For the comparison of bids in different bidding processes with different initial bid 
amounts (A) for each tender, it is preferable to use Drops (Di) rather than monetary-
based Bids (Bi). 
‘Economic Scoring Formula’ (ESF) refers to the mathematical expressions used to 
assign numerical scores to each bidder from the bid price expressed in drops. ESF 
comprises the mathematical operations that provide the score (which is not important 
for this study) and the mathematical expression that determines which bids are 
‘abnormal’ or ‘risky’ (Abnormally Low Bids Criteria, ALBC), i.e. too high or too low. 
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So far, ALBC has received much less attention in the literature than the analysis of 
bidding behaviors [48], the exception being the work on outliers (another term for 
‘abnormal bids’) in Bid Tender Forecasting Models developed by Skitmore [31, 49, 50]. 
Generally, the final aim of the ALBC is to reject ‘abnormally low bidders’; that is, those 
who bid below a minimum price threshold, which is usually pre-set deterministically on 
the tender specifications by a Contracting Authority. After being identified by the ALBC, 
the ‘abnormal bidders’ should provide evidence about the consistency of their 
proposals (both technically and economically). The problem is that no deterministic 
ALBC is able to predict which price implies a zero profit, since that depends largely on 
each bidder and each particular project. As a consequence, ALBC usually end up 
conditioning the final bidders’ bids distribution instead of accurately discriminating 
‘abnormal’ from ‘normal’ bidders. 
The method proposed in this paper can be considered an alternative non-deterministic 
ALBC that adapts to the final distribution of bidders, being able to distinguish bidders 
who have made bids based on similar technical and economic criteria from those who 
have not, and hence, might be considered as ‘abnormal’. 
4. Analysis of bidders’ bids distribution 
The proposed method is designed to detect abnormally high or low bids, while alerting 
for a possible collusion phenomenon. The method requires a previous analysis to 
determine the probable positions that each competitor will occupy, i.e., to study the bid 
distances from each other, so that the various competitor positions can be compared to 
a standard pattern distribution. 
It is also necessary to limit the number of potential bidders that would probably bid in a 
future tender. An extensive literature has focused on the study of the potential number 
of bidders [51, 52]. However, when a tender is overdue, the number of bidders is 
known and this variable enables setting a pattern distribution that must be close 
enough to the distribution generated by the bidders. 
From here on, some of the principles in the Position Probability Graphs devised by 
Ballesteros-Pérez et al. [36] will be applied, which demonstrate that the N bidders are 
usually placed equidistantly on average at the same probability intervals on capped 
tenders using a linear distribution [36, 53].1 
                                                 
1
 Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2012c) discuss how bidder position distributions can be better studied 
by means of beta distributions. However, the usual tender data scarcity regarding the behavior 
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Figure 1 shows that the relationship between bidder position (i) and the probability of 
surpassing the bidder drops (Pnth) according to Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (blue line) and 
follows this expression: 
𝑃𝑛𝑡ℎ =
𝑁−𝑖+1
𝑁
     (2) 
It must be noted that i=1 corresponds to the lowest bidder (most economical), whereas 
i=N is the highest bidder (most expensive). 
 
Figure1: Diagram showing two possible relationships between i and Pnth. 
Nevertheless, for detecting abnormal bids it is more suitable to use the following 
expression in order to reflect a symmetrical continuity correction (not an asymmetrical 
correction that is more convenient in PPGs). This equation is represented by means of 
a red line in Figure 1 as well: 
𝑃𝑛𝑡ℎ =
𝑁−𝑖+0.5
𝑁
     (3) 
It is now necessary to relate a particular bidder’s drop (Di) with a particular level of 
probability of being surpassed (Pnth). For the sake of convenience, it would be 
preferable to use a domain ranging between 0 and 1, instead of ranging between Dmin 
and Dmax. However, in order to point out an abnormal behavior, no bid should be more 
                                                                                                                                               
that a particular Economic Scoring Formula generates in the bidders, makes it advisable to use 
simple linear distributions (which is a particular case of the beta distribution and usually fits well 
enough). 
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distant than 1 𝑁⁄  from the bidders’ bids extremes, that is, the minimum drop (Dmin) or 
the maximum drop (Dmax). So, introducing these two corrections enables what the 
authors have called Standard drops (D’i) to be obtained. 
To obtain these Standard drops from a set of bids, firstly, they must be transformed into 
drops using the expression (1) and then the following expression must be applied: 
𝐷𝑖
′ =
1
2𝑁
+
𝑁−1
𝑁
·
𝐷𝑖−𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛
    (4) 
Then, starting with a series of bids and their respective ordered positions (Bi, i), a new 
set of points: (D’i, Pnth) is obtained. These last set of points will be properly analyzed 
below. 
5. Assumptions 
As Porter and Zona [20, 40] and Bajari and Ye [46, 47] showed in their work, at this 
point the proposed method must posit the two following assumptions. Firstly, each 
firm/bidder has private information about its costs. Even though each firm’s precise 
cost is known only to itself, there is public information about factors that affect 
(although they do not completely determine) various firms’ costs. Thus, firms will have 
some information about the approximate level of their costs relative to those of other 
firms [54]. 
Secondly, the method assumes that the bidding strategies by firms are a Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. In equilibrium, firms are rational and submit bids that maximize their 
expected profits, taking into account all possible information about themselves and 
their rival firms. A profit-maximizing firm must trade off the benefits of increasing its bid 
(a higher profit conditional on winning) against the costs of increasing its bid (winning 
the contract with lower probability) [6]. 
Although other formal and analytical risk models have recently been developed to 
prescribe how risk is to be incorporated into bids (particularly in construction bids) [55, 
56, 57, 58], in practice, price risks are usually excluded from the final bid in order to 
improve competitiveness [59]. 
Indeed, some recent conceptual models have also been developed for use by 
contractors as part of a more reliable approach for identifying key competitors and as a 
basis for formulating bidding strategies [57, 60]. Competitiveness among bids is 
examined using linear mixed models that employ variables such as project type and 
size, work sector, work nature, market conditions, as well as number of bidders [57, 58, 
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61]. Some of these variables, such as project type and size, work sector, work nature, 
and market conditions are very difficult to quantify. 
The two assumptions shown at the beginning of this section are a synonym of the 
following statement: ‘if a series of bidders bid with the same criteria, then, their 
economic bids must follow the same statistical distribution’. 
That particular statistical distribution (only applicable when bids have been previously 
converted into Standard drops) is what the authors call ‘Standard Pattern distribution’ 
and whose cumulative distribution equation is: 
Ypattern = Di
′
     (5) 
That is, the Standard Pattern cumulative distribution represents a bisector line and its 
values range, according to Equation 4, from 1 2𝑁⁄   to  1 −
1
2𝑁⁄  both in the X and Y 
axes. This distribution implies that a group of bidders which has entered a particular 
tender will be 1 𝑁⁄  apart from each other, both in their D’i values and Pnth values, 
whenever they perfectly fit a Standard Pattern distribution. 
Nonetheless, a perfect correspondence between the Standard Pattern distribution in a 
particular tender set of (D’i, Pnth) points is hardly possible; so, in order to establish a 
zone in which the actual (D’i, Pnth) point distribution can be considered as not far 
enough from the Standard Pattern line, upper and lower limit lines have been defined. 
The equations of those limit lines are the following, and they are placed a distance that 
equals 1 2𝑁⁄  above and under the Standard Pattern line: 
Ylower = Di
′ −
1
2N
  Yupper = Di
′ +
1
2N
 (6) and (7) 
Since the line generated by the (D’i, Pnth) points is a multi-segmented curve, it is 
advisable to begin working with their optimal regression straight line (least squares). In 
this way, if the optimal straight line is completely inside the zone delimited by the upper 
and lower limit lines then the bidders’ bids distribution can be assumed to be following 
the principles of conditional independence and exchangeability, that is, no bid or group 
of (collusive or abnormal) bids has caused a distortion in the group of N bids greater 
than an 1 𝑁⁄  value. 
There is only one exception that must be taken into account. A particular group of 
bidders could follow two or more Standard Pattern distributions at the same time if they 
were assuming different ways of carrying out the same tender (for example by using 
different technologies to perform the same contract). Although this may seem a major 
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drawback, it is not as important as it seems. From among different technologies (if the 
cause of the difference is due to a different manner of performing the contract, which is 
the most common cause) the potential contractors or bidders usually know which 
approach is best (or at least the cheapest), and so they will tend to study their costs 
with the same assumptions and with few variations. When the contract becomes more 
complex, regarding the variety and/or necessary steps to be performed, the application 
of different ways of carrying out each phase tends to lose importance, since most 
technologies are shared among contractors. 
In the case of contracts with a fuzzy scope, this exception might become important, but 
abnormal bidders should always be able to justify their offers later if they are finally 
considered as abnormal bidders when applying the methodology developed in this 
paper. 
6. Proposed methodology 
Given a complete set of bidders’ bids entered in a tender, the following steps must be 
fulfilled: 
1. Order their values from the least (i=1) to the most expensive (i=N). 
2. Calculate the respective drops (Di) using Equation 1. 
3. Calculate the standard drops (D’i) using Equation 4. 
4. Calculate the respective probability values (Pnth) using Equation 3. 
5. Represent the previous new dataset of (D’i, Pnth) values in a graph similar to the 
one shown in Figure 2. 
6. Calculate the optimal regression straight line of the (D’i, Pnth) values and draw it 
in the same graph. 
7. Represent the Standard Pattern line (according to Equation 5) and the limit 
lines (according to Equations 6 and 7) in the previous graph. 
When this multi-step process is done, a new graph, termed a ‘Standard Drop Graph’ 
(SDG) by the authors, will have been generated and a tender analyst will be able to 
start studying the bidders’ bids distribution. An example of a generic SDG is shown in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure2: Explanation of the items shown in a Standard Drop Graph (SDG) 
As mentioned above, whenever a bidders’ bid distribution is close enough to its 
Standard Pattern line, (i.e., the optimal regression straight line is completely within the 
zone set by the upper and lower limit lines) the bidders’ distribution reflects the 
‘exchangeability’ condition. Nevertheless, a previous condition must also be fulfilled. 
The quadratic correlation factor of the optimal regression straight line must high 
enough (usually above 0.90) to say that the bidders’ bids dataset is properly 
represented by this regression curve. 
Additionally, the ‘conditional independence’ condition must be fulfilled. This condition 
requires another two verifications. Firstly, the residuals generated from the deviations 
between the D’i ‘s Pnth and Ystandard values must follow a Normal distribution; thus, a t-
Student test must be performed on the residuals dataset. Secondly, the average of the 
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D’i standard drops (D’m) must be close enough to the value 0.5, that is, not far from the 
center of the SDG. 
Since, a bidders’ bids distribution with absence of abnormal and collusive bids is 
approximately symmetrical around its Dm value according to [53], this condition, 
translated into the new equation stated in the mathematical expression (3), means 
D’m=Pnth=0.5. Therefore, a new parameter is created for monitoring the deviation of D’m, 
termed D’m·distortion that measures the distance from the 0.5 value in 1 𝑁⁄  multiples. Its 
mathematical expression is the following (standard mean drop distortion): 
Dm dist.
′ =
|Dm
′ −0.5|
0.5
1
N
= N
|Dm
′ −0.5|
0.5
= N|2Dm
′ − 1| =  N |2
Dm−Dmin
Dmax−Dmin
− 1| (8) 
Measuring this D’m deviation as a function of 1 𝑁⁄  multiples reveals how many bidder 
positions the D’m value has displaced, since the bidders’ positions distance is the same 
in both the X and Y axes, that is 1 𝑁⁄  .Usually, a value of D’m distortion lower than 1 should 
be required. 
Therefore, in order to ensure ‘conditional independence’ and ‘exchangeability’ in a 
group of bidders, the four mathematical tests explained above should be passed. 
Whenever a bidding group does not observe one or several of the conditions stated 
above, it will mean that one or several of the bidders behaved abnormally. If those 
bidders cannot justify their economic bids, they could be potentially qualified as 
collusive bidders, especially if they show similar behavior in subsequent tenders. 
However, the proposed methodology is only capable of detecting collusive bidders (out 
of abnormal bids) when the bidders are placed near the D’i distribution extremes, that 
is, they are among the highest or lowest values of the D’i dataset. Nonetheless, a 
collusive bidder generally must be extremely high or low in order to exert sufficient 
impact on a bidders’ distribution, especially when cartel bids are not the majority; so, 
most commonly, a bidder (or a group of collusive bidders) is forced to be extreme to 
exert influence and this enables detection. 
In order to prove the point above and to close this particular issue, the only four types 
of common collusive schemes that can be detected by the proposed method are 
summarized in Table 1. 
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Table1: Most common bid-covering strategy classification 
In passive collusive schemes, a protector bid (phony bid or collusive bid) bids 
extremely low in order to lower the drops average (Dm), so that extremely high non-
cartel bids are rejected (usually lowering the abnormal threshold specified in the tender 
specifications). In active collusive schemes, a protector bid takes higher risks and 
offers extremely high bids in order to raise the drops average (Dm), so that the cartel 
bid designated as potential bidder is more likely to be inside the abnormality threshold. 
In both active and passive schemes, the protected bidder (the one who is trying to win 
and is assisted by supporting or protector phony bids) will choose higher or lower bids 
depending on the profit margin the particular tender offers the potential contractors. 
When the profit margin is low and the protected bidder is among the main body of non-
collusive bidders, the protected bidders may be extremely difficult to detect. 
Nevertheless, in these cases, the protected bidders are not usually acting (in 
exclusively economic terms) abnormally, since their bids are within the usual profit 
limits. 
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7. Tender review 
To study the Scoring Parameters and Economic Scoring Formulas used in Spain, 120 
tender specifications documents from Spanish Public Administrations and private 
companies were reviewed ([62], Annex I). The review is quite representative of the 
Spanish tendering system, as it comprises tenders and auctions by both public (city 
councils, local councils, semi-public entities, universities, ministries, etc.) and private 
contracting authorities, as well; it includes a wide variety of civil engineering works and 
services from various geographical regions (including the islands) and features a wide 
range of economic tender amounts. Although the sample only contains Spanish tender 
documents, the variables analyzed are directly applicable to any country where 
requesting administrations or contracting authorities set an initial tender amount 
against which candidates must underbid (capped tendering or upper-limit-price 
tendering). 
Among the wide range of tender documents collected, several contracting authorities 
generated sufficient tendering processes to enable an in-depth statistical analysis. 
Although the results obtained from these contracting authorities were very similar, a 
sub-dataset from one public administration was selected in order to illustrate (through 
several numeric examples) the analysis of bidders’ bids distribution. 
The selected public administration is the ‘Agencia Catalana del Agua’ (Catalonian 
Water Agency), ACA hereinafter, a semi-public administration that manages most of 
the water supply system in the Catalan region of Spain. ACA managed 51 construction 
tenders in approximately one year (from May 2007 to June 2008) ([62], Annex II). 
8. Calculations and results 
Appendix B reflects the application of the method explained in Section 6 on a subset of 
three tenders extracted from Ballesteros-Pérez [62] (Annexes I and II). Despite the fact 
that the authors tried the same test in a large number of different tenders with a wide 
variety of results regarding the Economic Scoring Formulae, the results are always 
approximately the same. 
In Appendix B, each tender shows two tables: the first table reflects the bidders’ bid 
distribution of that tender taking into account all the bidders. The second table reflects 
the bidders’ bids distribution after removing several bidders’ bids that were distorting 
the distribution sufficiently away from the Standard Pattern distribution (more than 1 𝑁⁄  
on average). Therefore, the second table in each case reflects those bidders whose 
bids can be considered as ‘normal’, while those removed must be initially considered 
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as ‘abnormally high or low’. A repeated pattern of abnormality by a particular bidder(s) 
in several tenders might be considered as potentially collusive, unless the bidder is 
able to justify (technically and/or economically) why its bids were so unexpectedly high 
or low on each occasion. 
Concerning the structure of the tables shown in Appendix B, their organization is as 
follows. In the top left row, each table contains descriptive data from the tender: code; 
correspondence with Ballesteros-Pérez [62] Annex II thesis ID; tender deadline; 
Contracting Public/Private Authority (Cont. Aut.); economic bid weight with regard to 
the total tender scoring (EBW); and nature of the work (NOW). 
Below, also on the left, a second row shows several calculations relative to the tender: 
number of bidders studied (N); the tender amount (although this is a value that could 
have been specified in the upper row, it is more convenient to put it here, above the 
bidders’ economic bids); the maximum, minimum, and mean drops (Dmax, Dmin and Dm, 
respectively); and the percentage of bidders that have already been removed (Abn. 
Bids). 
Just under the previous row, there is a large table whose columns perform the major 
calculations stated in the previous sections: the first column is an auxiliary that 
enables/disables each bidder’s data (Active?); the second column reflects the bidder’s 
position (i); the third shows each bid in euros (Bi) which is translated into drops in the 
fourth column (Di); the fifth column reflects the Standard drops of each bidder 
calculated according to Equation 4 (D’i), which are the X-values, while the Y-values 
correspond to the Pnth values calculated as a function of Equation 3 and represented in 
column 6; the last but one column shows each bidder’s i correspondent Ypattern value as 
a function of Equation 5; whereas, finally, column eight calculates the differences 
between Ypattern and Pnth values, that is, the residuals. 
In the top right corner there is a series of three rows in which the main bid distribution 
acceptance calculations are performed (‘monitoring parameters’): 
 In the first row, the first two cells are for calculating the mean Standard drop, 
whose translation into multiples of 1 𝑁⁄  are represented in the second cell. 
Values lower than 1 mean that the bidders’ distribution has caused sufficiently 
little impact. The second cell is calculated according to Equation 8. 
 The last cell in the first row evidences the quadratic correlation coefficient of 
the optimal straight line from the active standard drop bids distribution. This 
correlation factor coincides with the linear relationship with the Standard 
Pattern line. It is advisable that this cell exceeds a 0.90 value. 
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 When the optimal regression line is completely within the zone delimited by the 
two limit lines calculated by equations 6 and 7, the first cell in the second row 
reflects the word ‘Yes’ in blue. This is a necessary condition in order to state 
that the optimal regression line is close enough to the Standard Pattern 
distribution. Another two cells in this row represents the optimal regression 
line’s interception and gradient (useful for auxiliary calculations). 
 In the third row, a Normality test is performed by means of a t-Student test in 
the residual dataset. If this test is passed, this will be reflected in the first cell 
and this means that the bidders’ bids distribution oscillates around the 
Standard Pattern line as a group of bidders with no correlation between them. 
To accept a bidders’ bid distribution for a particular tender, four conditions must be 
observed: D’m distortion<1 ; R
2> 0.90; (D’i , Pnth) optimal regression straight line must be 
completely within zone delimited by the upper and lower limit lines; and their residuals 
must fit a Normal distribution (checking their t-Student value, with an α value equaling 
5% for instance). 
Furthermore, two tables in the right center show accessory calculations to help draw 
the SDG explained in Section 6. This graph is also represented for each particular 
selection of bidders in the bottom right corner. 
When removing bidders’ bids from the initial set of bidders, a tender analyst applying 
this method must keep in mind the following rule: he/she must always remove the 
minimum number of bidders in order to fulfill the four ‘monitoring parameters’. No 
matter whether the bidders’ bids are from the top or the bottom, whenever their 
removal number is the minimum possible. Concerning which bidders to remove, it is 
usually advisable to remove the next highest or lowest bidder who makes the D’m 
distortion move quicker towards zero, until the remaining bidders fit the Standard 
Pattern distribution. 
To verify the reliability of the method proposed, the authors performed a series of 
experiments mixing different proportions of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ bidders. This led to 
the conclusion that the model is robust enough whenever two conditions are 
simultaneously fulfilled: 
a) The number of bidders equals or is above five bidders (N≥5). 
b) The number of collusive bids (including the protected bidder) is below 50% of 
the total number of bidders. 
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Initially, sensitivity analysis proved that whenever there are three or four bidders, the 
method would be mathematically consistent, but in the case of collusion with so few 
total bidders, collusive bidders would represent a percentage of bidders equal to or 
above 50% (since at least one protector bidder plus the protected bidder would total 
two collusive bidders), and hence, the collusion phenomenon would be undetectable. 
9. Discussion and conclusions 
So far, no empirical techniques for detecting collusion are likely to be flawless and 
complete by themselves. Nonetheless, the authors believe that the approach described 
in this paper is a useful further step since it resolves several problems identified with 
earlier models: 
 Until now, models have only been applied to auctions, not to tenders, in which 
other non-economic criteria are implemented. 
 Models usually require plenty of information about the potential bidders and the 
project details in order to apply the statistical tests for checking the two 
conditions (conditional independence and exchangeability). Therefore, previous 
tests have only been applied to relatively simple tenders. 
 Previous models require advanced mathematical regression techniques and a 
sufficient number of previous tenders to be applicable. 
 A sufficiently sophisticated cartel could avoid detection using tests for 
conditional independence and exchangeability in order to remain undetected. 
Porter and Zona [20] documented that the residuals to estimate bid functions for 
firms in the cartel are much more highly correlated with each other than the 
residuals for the non-cartel firms. However, if a cartel plans to mimic 
competitive behavior then this can be achieved. 
The method presented here partly solves these problems because: 
 It can be applied to general tenders, both public and private, just as the tenders 
used as examples in this paper to illustrate the method implementation. 
 No information is needed about the potential bidders (except for their economic 
bids) or about the project, since only abnormally high and/or low bids are 
detected. 
 The required mathematical calculations are very simple and the particular 
representation of the bidders’ bids guides the auctioneer or Contracting 
Authority at any time regarding deviations from a Standard Pattern distribution. 
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 This method cannot be used the other way around, i.e., it cannot be applied by 
a cartel to disguise a series of phony bids, except when the cartel’s firms are a 
majority of the total number of bidders. 
Nonetheless, the proposed method has two main limitations: 
1. It is only useful for detecting abnormally high or low bids, while discovering 
whether those bids are collusive or not would require a repetitive pattern in 
several tenders by the same companies and further investigation to be 
performed by the Contracting Authority. This problem is shared with previous 
methods. 
2. It does not provide information about potential collusive behavior located in the 
middle of the bidders’ bids range, i.e., only highest and lowest bids stand out 
concerning this method. 
These two limitations are constrained by the fact that in order to generate a sufficient 
effect on the bid distribution almost any fraudulently covering bid must be extremely 
high or low, since the closer a collusive bid is to the bids’ average (Dm when expressed 
in drops), the less collusive its effect is. 
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the test presented in this paper can be 
complemented with existing tests, enabling an auctioneer to minimize the 
disadvantages of each test.  
Concerning the robustness of the model, sensitivity analysis to all monitoring 
parameters proved its reliability when the number of bidders equals five or more and 
the number of collusive bids (including the protected bidder) does not equal or surpass 
half of the total number of bidders. Therefore, when preparing tender specifications, the 
auctioneer or Contracting Authority should bear in mind that open tendering processes 
with publicity always attract a larger number of bidders (increasing this method’s 
reliability) but, if it were necessary to resort to a selective tendering process, the 
number of invited bidders should always exceed four. 
10. Future work 
From a research viewpoint, the method presented in this paper has only been applied 
to capped tendering. Nevertheless, the different variables the method uses can be 
transformed to be set as a function of monetary values instead of drop values, which is 
indispensable on uncapped tendering. The next aim is to research the Standard 
Pattern line that bidders’ bids distribution follows on uncapped tenders. 
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Whereas capped tendering can use drops (X-axis values ranging from 0 to 1), 
uncapped tendering will have to use semi-infinite ranges of values on the X-axis (prices 
ranging from 0 to infinite). Moreover, both capped and non-capped tendering share 
some statistical conditions, so the adaption can be researched. 
In parallel with this test adaptation to uncapped tenders, a comprehensive study on 
how to alert to the possibility of collusive bidders that are near the average of the bids 
distribution will be continued. 
However, from a practical viewpoint, that is, with regard to operatively implementing 
this new tool in the public and private sector, the authors recommend initially 
introducing this method as a sort of background test (only for the eyes of the 
Contracting Authority), so they will be able to know which potential collusive activity is 
taking place in its tenders without any previous knowledge about it from the bidders. 
If the method eventually proved to be a new useful ALBC for a particular Contracting 
Authority’s context, then it would be up to the person in charge of supervising the 
tenders to decide whether this method should be integrated within future tender 
specifications or remain as a concealed monitoring tool. 
Appendix A 
Main abbreviations used in the text: 
A Amount of money of a tender (upper price limit) 
ACA Agencia Catalana del Agua (owner of tendering sub-dataset analyzed) 
ALBC Abnormally low bids criteria 
Bi Bidder’s i bid (expressed in monetary value) 
BTFM Bid tender forecasting model 
Di Bidder’s i drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dm Mean drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dmax Maximum drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dmin Minimum drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dnth Bidder’s nth drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
ESF Economic scoring formula 
i Bidder’s i position 
N Total number of bidders for a particular tender 
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Pnth Probability of surpassing bidder nth (usually expressed in per-unit value) 
PPG Position probability graph 
SDG Standard drop graph 
SW Sewage system 
WWTP Waste water treatment plant 
Appendix B 
Three examples of bidders’ bids distribution analysis. 
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Table 2: Analysis of bidders’ bids distribution (Tender #1) with all bidders 
Analysis of Bidders' Distribution Entry ID 1
Dm Distor. Analysis Std. Pattern line Regression
T. Code Thesis ID Deadline Cont. Aut. EBW NOW μ Resid. D'm D'm distortion R^2
CT08001116 A00 6/16/08 ACA 0,4 WWTP+SW 0,0479 0,5519 1,3499 0,9654
Optimal Straight Line Regression
Nº bids (N) T. Amount Dmax Dmin Dm Abn. Bids σ Resid. Within Limits? Y-axis's Intercept. Line Gradient
13 6.131.465,05 € 0,2013 0,0000 0,1111 0,00 0,0607 No -0,0970 1,0895
Residuals Normality Test (mean)
Active? Bidder (i) Bi (€) Di D'i Pnth Ypattern Resid. D'i tst D'i < tst α? tstud. (α=5%) tstud. D'i
1 1 4.897.082,06 0,2013 0,9615 0,9615 0,9615 0,0000 No 2,1788 2,8452
1 2 5.054.779,79 0,1756 0,8436 0,8846 0,8436 -0,0410
1 3 5.167.018,80 0,1573 0,7597 0,8077 0,7597 -0,0480 List of abbreviations:
1 4 5.208.165,78 0,1506 0,7289 0,7308 0,7289 -0,0019 T. Code : Tender code
1 5 5.242.272,50 0,1450 0,7034 0,6538 0,7034 0,0496 Cont. Aut. : Contracting Public/Private Authority
1 6 5.260.797,01 0,1420 0,6896 0,5769 0,6896 0,1126 EBW : Economic bid Weight
1 7 5.361.353,05 0,1256 0,6144 0,5000 0,6144 0,1144 NOW : Nature of work
1 8 5.490.113,82 0,1046 0,5181 0,4231 0,5181 0,0950 T. Amount : Tender monetary amount
1 9 5.638.889,60 0,0803 0,4068 0,3462 0,4068 0,0607 Abn. Bids : Abnomally low/high bids
1 10 5.754.379,95 0,0615 0,3204 0,2692 0,3204 0,0512 Resid. D'i : Residuals D'i  
1 11 5.767.256,03 0,0594 0,3108 0,1923 0,3108 0,1185 μ / σ Resid. : Residuals average/desvest
1 12 5.878.848,67 0,0412 0,2274 0,1154 0,2274 0,1120 Bi : Bidder i 's monetary bid
1 13 6.131.465,05 0,0000 0,0385 0,0385 0,0385 0,0000 Di : Bidder i 's drop
1 D'i : Bidder i 's Standard drop
1
1 Representation of major l ines
1 X Y (Optimal line) Y (Pattern)
1 0,0385 -0,0551 0,0385
1 0,9615 0,9506 0,9615
1 X Y (Upper limit) Y (Lower limit)
1 0,0385 0,0769 0,0000
1 0,9615 1,0000 0,9231
1 Intersections  (Opt. line with Pattern Up. & Low. Lines)
1 Xlow Xup
1 0,6536 -
1 Ylow Yup
1 0,6152 -
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Cell formulae:
Di = 1 - (Bi/T. Amount) Ypattern = D'i
Dmax = Max (Di) D'i = (1/2N) + ((N-1)/(2N))*((Di  - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin))
Dmin = Min (Di) Resid. D'i = Ypattern - Pnth
Dm = Avg (Di) R^2 = Pearson's correlation coefficient ^2 (between D'i  and Pnth or Ypattern)
D'm = (Dm - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin) tstud. D'i = μ Resid. / ( σ Resid. / Sqrt (N))
D'm distortion = N*ABS(2*Dm - 1) Y (upper limit) =  Ypattern + 1/(2N)
Pnth = (N - i + 0.5) / N Y (lower limit) =  Ypattern - 1/(2N)
Xlow
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0
Pnth
Standard Drops (D'i)
Standard Pattern line
Std Pattern upper and lower limit lines
Optimal Straight Line
Bidders' Standard Drops (D'i)
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Table 3: Analysis of bidders’ bids distribution (Tender #1) with extreme bidders 
eliminated 
Analysis of Bidders' Distribution Entry ID 1
Dm Distor. Analysis Std. Pattern line Regression
T. Code Thesis ID Deadline Cont. Aut. EBW NOW μ Resid. D'm D'm distortion R^2
CT08001116 A00 6/16/08 ACA 0,4 WWTP+SW -0,0051 0,4945 0,1332 0,9725
Optimal Straight Line Regression
Nº bids (N) T. Amount Dmax Dmin Dm Abn. Bids σ Resid. Within Limits? Y-axis's Intercept. Line Gradient
12 6.131.465,05 € 0,2013 0,0412 0,1204 0,08 0,0502 Yes -0,0051 1,0207
Residuals Normality Test (mean)
Active? Bidder (i) Bi (€) Di D'i Pnth Ypattern Resid. D'i tst D'i < tst α? tstud. (α=5%) tstud. D'i
1 1 4.897.082,06 0,2013 0,9583 0,9583 0,9583 0,0000 Yes 2,2010 0,3510
1 2 5.054.779,79 0,1756 0,8111 0,8750 0,8111 -0,0639
1 3 5.167.018,80 0,1573 0,7063 0,7917 0,7063 -0,0854 List of abbreviations:
1 4 5.208.165,78 0,1506 0,6679 0,7083 0,6679 -0,0405 T. Code : Tender code
1 5 5.242.272,50 0,1450 0,6360 0,6250 0,6360 0,0110 Cont. Aut. : Contracting Public/Private Authority
1 6 5.260.797,01 0,1420 0,6187 0,5417 0,6187 0,0771 EBW : Economic bid Weight
1 7 5.361.353,05 0,1256 0,5248 0,4583 0,5248 0,0665 NOW : Nature of work
1 8 5.490.113,82 0,1046 0,4046 0,3750 0,4046 0,0296 T. Amount : Tender monetary amount
1 9 5.638.889,60 0,0803 0,2657 0,2917 0,2657 -0,0260 Abn. Bids : Abnomally low/high bids
1 10 5.754.379,95 0,0615 0,1579 0,2083 0,1579 -0,0505 Resid. D'i : Residuals D'i  
1 11 5.767.256,03 0,0594 0,1459 0,1250 0,1459 0,0209 μ / σ Resid. : Residuals average/desvest
1 12 5.878.848,67 0,0412 0,0417 0,0417 0,0417 0,0000 Bi : Bidder i 's monetary bid
Di : Bidder i 's drop
1 D'i : Bidder i 's Standard drop
1
1 Representation of major l ines
1 X Y (Optimal line) Y (Pattern)
1 0,0417 0,0374 0,0417
1 0,9583 0,9730 0,9583
1 X Y (Upper limit) Y (Lower limit)
1 0,0417 0,0833 0,0000
1 0,9583 1,0000 0,9167
1 Intersections  (Opt. line with Pattern Up. & Low. Lines)
1 Xlow Xup
1 - -
1 Ylow Yup
1 - -
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Cell formulae:
Di = 1 - (Bi/T. Amount) Ypattern = D'i
Dmax = Max (Di) D'i = (1/2N) + ((N-1)/(2N))*((Di  - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin))
Dmin = Min (Di) Resid. D'i = Ypattern - Pnth
Dm = Avg (Di) R^2 = Pearson's correlation coefficient ^2 (between D'i  and Pnth or Ypattern)
D'm = (Dm - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin) tstud. D'i = μ Resid. / ( σ Resid. / Sqrt (N))
D'm distortion = N*ABS(2*Dm - 1) Y (upper limit) =  Ypattern + 1/(2N)
Pnth = (N - i + 0.5) / N Y (lower limit) =  Ypattern - 1/(2N)
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0
Pnth
Standard Drops (D'i)
Standard Pattern line
Std Pattern upper and lower limit lines
Optimal Straight Line
Bidders' Standard Drops (D'i)
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Table 4: Analysis of bidders’ bids distribution (Tender #2) with all bidders 
Analysis of Bidders' Distribution Entry ID 20
Dm Distor. Analysis Std. Pattern line Regression
T. Code Thesis ID Deadline Cont. Aut. EBW NOW μ Resid. D'm D'm distortion R^2
CT07002648 A19 12/31/07 ACA 0,4 SW -0,0834 0,4147 7,6774 0,9786
Optimal Straight Line Regression
Nº bids (N) T. Amount Dmax Dmin Dm Abn. Bids σ Resid. Within Limits? Y-axis's Intercept. Line Gradient
45 7.018.943,29 € 0,3282 0,0003 0,1362 0,00 0,0438 No 0,0683 1,0362
Residuals Normality Test (mean)
Active? Bidder (i) Bi (€) Di D'i Pnth Ypattern Resid. D'i tst D'i < tst α? tstud. (α=5%) tstud. D'i
1 1 4.715.326,10 0,3282 0,9889 0,9889 0,9889 0,0000 No 2,0154 12,7654
1 2 5.039.519,58 0,2820 0,8512 0,9667 0,8512 -0,1155
1 3 5.088.031,98 0,2751 0,8306 0,9444 0,8306 -0,1139 List of abbreviations:
1 4 5.088.733,88 0,2750 0,8303 0,9222 0,8303 -0,0919 T. Code : Tender code
1 5 5.110.701,86 0,2719 0,8209 0,9000 0,8209 -0,0791 Cont. Aut. : Contracting Public/Private Authority
1 6 5.114.000,00 0,2714 0,8195 0,8778 0,8195 -0,0582 EBW : Economic bid Weight
1 7 5.347.031,00 0,2382 0,7206 0,8556 0,7206 -0,1350 NOW : Nature of work
1 8 5.389.846,55 0,2321 0,7024 0,8333 0,7024 -0,1310 T. Amount : Tender monetary amount
1 9 5.464.247,00 0,2215 0,6708 0,8111 0,6708 -0,1403 Abn. Bids : Abnomally low/high bids
1 10 5.489.229,50 0,2179 0,6602 0,7889 0,6602 -0,1287 Resid. D'i : Residuals D'i  
1 11 5.614.043,93 0,2002 0,6071 0,7667 0,6071 -0,1595 μ / σ Resid. : Residuals average/desvest
1 12 5.615.154,48 0,2000 0,6067 0,7444 0,6067 -0,1378 Bi : Bidder i 's monetary bid
1 13 5.632.701,99 0,1975 0,5992 0,7222 0,5992 -0,1230 Di : Bidder i 's drop
1 14 5.640.969,81 0,1963 0,5957 0,7000 0,5957 -0,1043 D'i : Bidder i 's Standard drop
1 15 5.711.314,16 0,1863 0,5658 0,6778 0,5658 -0,1120
1 16 5.716.929,31 0,1855 0,5634 0,6556 0,5634 -0,0921 Representation of major l ines
1 17 5.730.062,89 0,1836 0,5579 0,6333 0,5579 -0,0755 X Y (Optimal line) Y (Pattern)
1 18 5.909.950,25 0,1580 0,4814 0,6111 0,4814 -0,1297 0,0111 0,0798 0,0111
1 19 5.919.022,66 0,1567 0,4776 0,5889 0,4776 -0,1113 0,9889 1,0930 0,9889
1 20 5.965.399,90 0,1501 0,4579 0,5667 0,4579 -0,1088 X Y (Upper limit) Y (Lower limit)
1 21 5.998.548,51 0,1454 0,4438 0,5444 0,4438 -0,1006 0,0111 0,0222 0,0000
1 22 6.018.744,85 0,1425 0,4352 0,5222 0,4352 -0,0870 0,9889 1,0000 0,9778
1 23 6.062.261,32 0,1363 0,4167 0,5000 0,4167 -0,0833 Intersections  (Opt. line with Pattern Up. & Low. Lines)
1 24 6.084.020,04 0,1332 0,4075 0,4778 0,4075 -0,0703 Xlow Xup
1 25 6.109.990,13 0,1295 0,3965 0,4556 0,3965 -0,0591 - -
1 26 6.131.046,96 0,1265 0,3875 0,4333 0,3875 -0,0458 Ylow Yup
1 27 6.141.575,38 0,1250 0,3831 0,4111 0,3831 -0,0281 - -
1 28 6.161.633,33 0,1221 0,3745 0,3889 0,3745 -0,0144
1 29 6.192.111,77 0,1178 0,3616 0,3667 0,3616 -0,0051
1 30 6.246.455,30 0,1101 0,3385 0,3444 0,3385 -0,0059
1 31 6.307.924,33 0,1013 0,3124 0,3222 0,3124 -0,0098
1 32 6.484.801,71 0,0761 0,2373 0,3000 0,2373 -0,0627
1 33 6.492.522,54 0,0750 0,2340 0,2778 0,2340 -0,0438
1 34 6.703.090,84 0,0450 0,1445 0,2556 0,1445 -0,1110
1 35 6.725.551,46 0,0418 0,1350 0,2333 0,1350 -0,0983
1 36 6.808.374,99 0,0300 0,0998 0,2111 0,0998 -0,1113
1 37 6.898.919,00 0,0171 0,0613 0,1889 0,0613 -0,1275
1 38 6.948.753,86 0,0100 0,0402 0,1667 0,0402 -0,1265
1 39 6.971.916,37 0,0067 0,0303 0,1444 0,0303 -0,1141
1 40 6.980.339,10 0,0055 0,0268 0,1222 0,0268 -0,0955
1 41 6.990.867,50 0,0040 0,0223 0,1000 0,0223 -0,0777
1 42 7.011.222,00 0,0011 0,0136 0,0778 0,0136 -0,0641
1 43 7.012.268,28 0,0010 0,0132 0,0556 0,0132 -0,0424
1 44 7.015.433,82 0,0005 0,0119 0,0333 0,0119 -0,0215
1 45 7.017.188,55 0,0003 0,0111 0,0111 0,0111 0,0000
Cell formulae:
Di = 1 - (Bi/T. Amount) Ypattern = D'i
Dmax = Max (Di) D'i = (1/2N) + ((N-1)/(2N))*((Di  - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin))
Dmin = Min (Di) Resid. D'i = Ypattern - Pnth
Dm = Avg (Di) R^2 = Pearson's correlation coefficient ^2 (between D'i  and Pnth or Ypattern)
D'm = (Dm - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin) tstud. D'i = μ Resid. / ( σ Resid. / Sqrt (N))
D'm distortion = N*ABS(2*Dm - 1) Y (upper limit) =  Ypattern + 1/(2N)
Pnth = (N - i + 0.5) / N Y (lower limit) =  Ypattern - 1/(2N)
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0
Pnth
Standard Drops (D'i)
Standard Pattern line
Std Pattern upper and lower limit lines
Optimal Straight Line
Bidders' Standard Drops (D'i)
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Table 5: Analysis of bidders’ bids distribution (Tender #2) with extreme bidders 
eliminated 
Analysis of Bidders' Distribution Entry ID 20
Dm Distor. Analysis Std. Pattern line Regression
T. Code Thesis ID Deadline Cont. Aut. EBW NOW μ Resid. D'm D'm distortion R^2
CT07002648 A19 12/31/07 ACA 0,4 SW -0,0002 0,4998 0,0176 0,9788
Optimal Straight Line Regression
Nº bids (N) T. Amount Dmax Dmin Dm Abn. Bids σ Resid. Within Limits? Y-axis's Intercept. Line Gradient
41 7.018.943,29 € 0,2820 0,0011 0,1415 0,09 0,0431 Yes 0,0124 0,9756
Residuals Normality Test (mean)
Active? Bidder (i) Bi (€) Di D'i Pnth Ypattern Resid. D'i tst D'i < tst α? tstud. (α=5%) tstud. D'i
Yes 2,0211 0,0311
1 1 5.039.519,58 0,2820 0,9878 0,9878 0,9878 0,0000
1 2 5.088.031,98 0,2751 0,9638 0,9634 0,9638 0,0004 List of abbreviations:
1 3 5.088.733,88 0,2750 0,9635 0,9390 0,9635 0,0244 T. Code : Tender code
1 4 5.110.701,86 0,2719 0,9526 0,9146 0,9526 0,0379 Cont. Aut. : Contracting Public/Private Authority
1 5 5.114.000,00 0,2714 0,9510 0,8902 0,9510 0,0607 EBW : Economic bid Weight
1 6 5.347.031,00 0,2382 0,8356 0,8659 0,8356 -0,0302 NOW : Nature of work
1 7 5.389.846,55 0,2321 0,8145 0,8415 0,8145 -0,0270 T. Amount : Tender monetary amount
1 8 5.464.247,00 0,2215 0,7776 0,8171 0,7776 -0,0394 Abn. Bids : Abnomally low/high bids
1 9 5.489.229,50 0,2179 0,7653 0,7927 0,7653 -0,0274 Resid. D'i : Residuals D'i  
1 10 5.614.043,93 0,2002 0,7035 0,7683 0,7035 -0,0648 μ / σ Resid. : Residuals average/desvest
1 11 5.615.154,48 0,2000 0,7030 0,7439 0,7030 -0,0409 Bi : Bidder i 's monetary bid
1 12 5.632.701,99 0,1975 0,6943 0,7195 0,6943 -0,0252 Di : Bidder i 's drop
1 13 5.640.969,81 0,1963 0,6902 0,6951 0,6902 -0,0049 D'i : Bidder i 's Standard drop
1 14 5.711.314,16 0,1863 0,6554 0,6707 0,6554 -0,0153
1 15 5.716.929,31 0,1855 0,6526 0,6463 0,6526 0,0063 Representation of major l ines
1 16 5.730.062,89 0,1836 0,6461 0,6220 0,6461 0,0242 X Y (Optimal line) Y (Pattern)
1 17 5.909.950,25 0,1580 0,5571 0,5976 0,5571 -0,0405 0,0122 0,0243 0,0122
1 18 5.919.022,66 0,1567 0,5526 0,5732 0,5526 -0,0205 0,9878 0,9761 0,9878
1 19 5.965.399,90 0,1501 0,5297 0,5488 0,5297 -0,0191 X Y (Upper limit) Y (Lower limit)
1 20 5.998.548,51 0,1454 0,5133 0,5244 0,5133 -0,0111 0,0122 0,0244 0,0000
1 21 6.018.744,85 0,1425 0,5033 0,5000 0,5033 0,0033 0,9878 1,0000 0,9756
1 22 6.062.261,32 0,1363 0,4817 0,4756 0,4817 0,0061 Intersections  (Opt. line with Pattern Up. & Low. Lines)
1 23 6.084.020,04 0,1332 0,4710 0,4512 0,4710 0,0198 Xlow Xup
1 24 6.109.990,13 0,1295 0,4581 0,4268 0,4581 0,0313 - -
1 25 6.131.046,96 0,1265 0,4477 0,4024 0,4477 0,0453 Ylow Yup
1 26 6.141.575,38 0,1250 0,4425 0,3780 0,4425 0,0645 - -
1 27 6.161.633,33 0,1221 0,4326 0,3537 0,4326 0,0789
1 28 6.192.111,77 0,1178 0,4175 0,3293 0,4175 0,0882
1 29 6.246.455,30 0,1101 0,3906 0,3049 0,3906 0,0857
1 30 6.307.924,33 0,1013 0,3602 0,2805 0,3602 0,0797
1 31 6.484.801,71 0,0761 0,2727 0,2561 0,2727 0,0166
1 32 6.492.522,54 0,0750 0,2689 0,2317 0,2689 0,0371
1 33 6.703.090,84 0,0450 0,1647 0,2073 0,1647 -0,0427
1 34 6.725.551,46 0,0418 0,1535 0,1829 0,1535 -0,0294
1 35 6.808.374,99 0,0300 0,1126 0,1585 0,1126 -0,0460
1 36 6.898.919,00 0,0171 0,0678 0,1341 0,0678 -0,0664
1 37 6.948.753,86 0,0100 0,0431 0,1098 0,0431 -0,0667
1 38 6.971.916,37 0,0067 0,0316 0,0854 0,0316 -0,0537
1 39 6.980.339,10 0,0055 0,0275 0,0610 0,0275 -0,0335
1 40 6.990.867,50 0,0040 0,0223 0,0366 0,0223 -0,0143
1 41 7.011.222,00 0,0011 0,0122 0,0122 0,0122 0,0000
Cell formulae:
Di = 1 - (Bi/T. Amount) Ypattern = D'i
Dmax = Max (Di) D'i = (1/2N) + ((N-1)/(2N))*((Di  - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin))
Dmin = Min (Di) Resid. D'i = Ypattern - Pnth
Dm = Avg (Di) R^2 = Pearson's correlation coefficient ^2 (between D'i  and Pnth or Ypattern)
D'm = (Dm - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin) tstud. D'i = μ Resid. / ( σ Resid. / Sqrt (N))
D'm distortion = N*ABS(2*Dm - 1) Y (upper limit) =  Ypattern + 1/(2N)
Pnth = (N - i + 0.5) / N Y (lower limit) =  Ypattern - 1/(2N)
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0
Pnth
Standard Drops (D'i)
Standard Pattern line
Std Pattern upper and lower limit lines
Optimal Straight Line
Bidders' Standard Drops (D'i)
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Table 6: Analysis of bidders’ bids distribution (Tender #3) with all bidders 
Analysis of Bidders' Distribution Entry ID 25
Dm Distor. Analysis Std. Pattern line Regression
T. Code Thesis ID Deadline Cont. Aut. EBW NOW μ Resid. D'm D'm distortion R^2
CT07002493 A25 12/11/07 ACA 0.4 SW -0.0640 0.4334 3.3319 0.9118
Optimal Straight Line Regression
Nº bids (N) T. Amount Dmax Dmin Dm Abn. Bids σ Resid. Within Limits? Y-axis's Intercept. Line Gradient
25 2,739,723.18 € 0.4062 0.0500 0.2043 0.00 0.1060 No -0.0541 1.2707
Residuals Normality Test (mean)
Active? Bidder (i) Bi (€) Di D'i Pnth Ypattern Resid. D'i tst D'i < tst α? tstud. (α=5%) tstud. D'i
1 1 1,626,951.39 0.4062 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 0.0000 No 2.0639 3.0184
1 2 1,877,258.32 0.3148 0.7337 0.9400 0.7337 -0.2063
1 3 1,928,596.24 0.2961 0.6832 0.9000 0.6832 -0.2168 List of abbreviations:
1 4 1,972,842.60 0.2799 0.6397 0.8600 0.6397 -0.2203 T. Code : Tender code
1 5 1,984,929.44 0.2755 0.6278 0.8200 0.6278 -0.1922 Cont. Aut. : Contracting Public/Private Authority
1 6 1,986,025.33 0.2751 0.6267 0.7800 0.6267 -0.1533 EBW : Economic bid Weight
1 7 2,075,066.34 0.2426 0.5391 0.7400 0.5391 -0.2009 NOW : Nature of work
1 8 2,093,696.45 0.2358 0.5208 0.7000 0.5208 -0.1792 T. Amount : Tender monetary amount
1 9 2,122,463.55 0.2253 0.4925 0.6600 0.4925 -0.1675 Abn. Bids : Abnomally low/high bids
1 10 2,128,503.25 0.2231 0.4866 0.6200 0.4866 -0.1334 Resid. D'i : Residuals D'i  
1 11 2,145,477.22 0.2169 0.4699 0.5800 0.4699 -0.1101 μ / σ Resid. : Residuals average/desvest
1 12 2,160,270.00 0.2115 0.4553 0.5400 0.4553 -0.0847 Bi : Bidder i 's monetary bid
1 13 2,165,751.18 0.2095 0.4499 0.5000 0.4499 -0.0501 Di : Bidder i 's drop
1 14 2,172,496.58 0.2070 0.4433 0.4600 0.4433 -0.0167 D'i : Bidder i 's Standard drop
1 15 2,181,916.00 0.2036 0.4340 0.4200 0.4340 0.0140
1 16 2,232,874.00 0.1850 0.3839 0.3800 0.3839 0.0039 Representation of major l ines
1 17 2,259,937.10 0.1751 0.3573 0.3400 0.3573 0.0173 X Y (Optimal line) Y (Pattern)
1 18 2,282,189.40 0.1670 0.3354 0.3000 0.3354 0.0354 0.0200 -0.0287 0.0200
1 19 2,321,326.55 0.1527 0.2969 0.2600 0.2969 0.0369 0.9800 1.1912 0.9800
1 20 2,323,800.18 0.1518 0.2944 0.2200 0.2944 0.0744 X Y (Upper limit) Y (Lower limit)
1 21 2,328,050.13 0.1503 0.2902 0.1800 0.2902 0.1102 0.0200 0.0400 0.0000
1 22 2,379,997.53 0.1313 0.2391 0.1400 0.2391 0.0991 0.9800 1.0000 0.9600
1 23 2,568,490.48 0.0625 0.0537 0.1000 0.0537 -0.0463 Intersections  (Opt. line with Pattern Up. & Low. Lines)
1 24 2,575,065.82 0.0601 0.0472 0.0600 0.0472 -0.0128 Xlow Xup
1 25 2,602,735.50 0.0500 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0000 0.1258 0.2736
1 Ylow Yup
1 0.1058 0.2936
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Cell formulae:
Di = 1 - (Bi/T. Amount) Ypattern = D'i
Dmax = Max (Di) D'i = (1/2N) + ((N-1)/(2N))*((Di  - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin))
Dmin = Min (Di) Resid. D'i = Ypattern - Pnth
Dm = Avg (Di) R^2 = Pearson's correlation coefficient ^2 (between D'i  and Pnth or Ypattern)
D'm = (Dm - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin) tstud. D'i = μ Resid. / ( σ Resid. / Sqrt (N))
D'm distortion = N*ABS(2*Dm - 1) Y (upper limit) =  Ypattern + 1/(2N)
Pnth = (N - i + 0.5) / N Y (lower limit) =  Ypattern - 1/(2N)
Xlow
Xup
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Pnth
Standard Drops (D'i)
Standard Pattern line
Std Pattern upper and lower limit lines
Optimal Straight Line
Bidders' Standard Drops (D'i)
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Table 7: Analysis of bidders’ bids distribution (Tender #3) with extreme bidders 
eliminated 
Analysis of Bidders' Distribution Entry ID 25
Dm Distor. Analysis Std. Pattern line Regression
T. Code Thesis ID Deadline Cont. Aut. EBW NOW μ Resid. D'm D'm distortion R^2
CT07002493 A25 12/11/07 ACA 0,4 SW -0,0139 0,4852 0,5021 0,9618
Optimal Straight Line Regression
Nº bids (N) T. Amount Dmax Dmin Dm Abn. Bids σ Resid. Within Limits? Y-axis's Intercept. Line Gradient
17 2.739.723,18 € 0,2799 0,1518 0,2140 0,32 0,0582 Yes 0,0195 0,9885
Residuals Normality Test (mean)
Active? Bidder (i) Bi (€) Di D'i Pnth Ypattern Resid. D'i tst D'i < tst α? tstud. (α=5%) tstud. D'i
Yes 2,1199 0,9850
List of abbreviations:
1 1 1.972.842,60 0,2799 0,9706 0,9706 0,9706 0,0000 T. Code : Tender code
1 2 1.984.929,44 0,2755 0,9382 0,9118 0,9382 0,0264 Cont. Aut. : Contracting Public/Private Authority
1 3 1.986.025,33 0,2751 0,9352 0,8529 0,9352 0,0823 EBW : Economic bid Weight
1 4 2.075.066,34 0,2426 0,6965 0,7941 0,6965 -0,0977 NOW : Nature of work
1 5 2.093.696,45 0,2358 0,6465 0,7353 0,6465 -0,0888 T. Amount : Tender monetary amount
1 6 2.122.463,55 0,2253 0,5693 0,6765 0,5693 -0,1071 Abn. Bids : Abnomally low/high bids
1 7 2.128.503,25 0,2231 0,5531 0,6176 0,5531 -0,0645 Resid. D'i : Residuals D'i  
1 8 2.145.477,22 0,2169 0,5076 0,5588 0,5076 -0,0512 μ / σ Resid. : Residuals average/desvest
1 9 2.160.270,00 0,2115 0,4680 0,5000 0,4680 -0,0320 Bi : Bidder i 's monetary bid
1 10 2.165.751,18 0,2095 0,4533 0,4412 0,4533 0,0121 Di : Bidder i 's drop
1 11 2.172.496,58 0,2070 0,4352 0,3824 0,4352 0,0528 D'i : Bidder i 's Standard drop
1 12 2.181.916,00 0,2036 0,4099 0,3235 0,4099 0,0864
1 13 2.232.874,00 0,1850 0,2733 0,2647 0,2733 0,0085 Representation of major l ines
1 14 2.259.937,10 0,1751 0,2007 0,2059 0,2007 -0,0052 X Y (Optimal line) Y (Pattern)
1 15 2.282.189,40 0,1670 0,1410 0,1471 0,1410 -0,0061 0,0294 0,0485 0,0294
1 16 2.321.326,55 0,1527 0,0360 0,0882 0,0360 -0,0522 0,9706 0,9789 0,9706
1 17 2.323.800,18 0,1518 0,0294 0,0294 0,0294 0,0000 X Y (Upper limit) Y (Lower limit)
0,0294 0,0588 0,0000
0,9706 1,0000 0,9412
Intersections  (Opt. line with Pattern Up. & Low. Lines)
Xlow Xup
- -
1 Ylow Yup
1 - -
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Cell formulae:
Di = 1 - (Bi/T. Amount) Ypattern = D'i
Dmax = Max (Di) D'i = (1/2N) + ((N-1)/(2N))*((Di  - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin))
Dmin = Min (Di) Resid. D'i = Ypattern - Pnth
Dm = Avg (Di) R^2 = Pearson's correlation coefficient ^2 (between D'i  and Pnth or Ypattern)
D'm = (Dm - Dmin)/(Dmax - Dmin) tstud. D'i = μ Resid. / ( σ Resid. / Sqrt (N))
D'm distortion = N*ABS(2*Dm - 1) Y (upper limit) =  Ypattern + 1/(2N)
Pnth = (N - i + 0.5) / N Y (lower limit) =  Ypattern - 1/(2N)
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0
Pnth
Standard Drops (D'i)
Standard Pattern line
Std Pattern upper and lower limit lines
Optimal Straight Line
Bidders' Standard Drops (D'i)
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